Skills, Diversity, and the Politics of Immigration: Electoral Effects on the Far-Right in Chile*

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Abstract

Does immigration increase far-right support? The migration literature has debated this question for decades, with little consensus on whether local exposure to migrants fuels anti-immigrant voting or through which mechanisms. Most existing evidence comes from Western Europe and the United States, while far less is known about how migration shapes electoral outcomes in Global South democracies, which host the majority of the world's migrants and have increasingly experienced far-right mobilisation. This paper revisits the debate using recent Venezuelan and Haitian migration waves to Chile, a setting in which migrant groups differ sharply in cultural proximity and skill composition, allowing economic and cultural channels to be examined separately. Using administrative migration records and a shift-share instrumental variables strategy, I estimate the causal effect of local migrant exposure on electoral outcomes in the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections. The results do not support the view that migration drives far-right voting. Across local labour markets and municipalities, increases in migrant shares reduce support for the far-right and increase support for the centre-right. Culturally distant Haitian inflows do not generate a cultural-threat backlash and, once skill differences are held constant, further weaken far-right support. Overall, the findings indicate that exposure to migration reshapes competition within the right rather than fuelling far-right mobilisation.

1 Introduction

In the past few decades, migration has become a central topic in political economy and political science, largely because of the rise of far-right parties that openly advocate anti-immigrant policies across Europe and the United States (Alesina & Tabellini, 2024;

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Arzheimer, 2018; Cools, Finseraas, & Rogeberg, 2021; Moriconi, Peri, & Turati, 2022; Otto & Steinhardt, 2014). Despite this growing interest, there is still no academic consensus as to whether immigration drives the far-right vote or the mechanisms by which it does so. While a few argue that contact with the migrant population reduces hostility and weakens support for exclusionary parties (Lonsky, 2021; Pagliacci & Bonacini, 2022; Steinmayr, 2021; Vertier, Viskanic, & Gamalerio, 2023), others emphasise that fears of job competition (Halla, Wagner, & Zweimüller, 2017), pressure on public goods (Barone, D'Ignazio, De Blasio, & Naticchioni, 2016; Cremaschi, Rettl, Cappelluti, & De Vries, 2024; Gennaro, 2025), or cultural anxieties about neighbourhood change (Brunner & Kuhn, 2018; Mendez & Cutillas, 2014) drive anti-immigrant voting.

A central limitation of this literature is that it is overwhelmingly concentrated in Western Europe and the United States, even though developing countries host roughly 85% of the world's migrants (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). In these long-standing immigration destinations, migration has unfolded over decades, labour markets are highly regulated, welfare states are relatively expansive, and party systems often feature entrenched immigration cleavages. In such settings, political responses to immigration are shaped not only by local exposure but also by pre-existing attitudes, partisan cues, and media narratives, which complicates efforts to assess how migration influences electoral behaviour outside of these contexts. At the same time, even within industrialised democracies, economic and cultural mechanisms are sometimes difficult to disentangle empirically, since migrant inflows often bundle low-skilled status with cultural distance and involve multiple overlapping waves. As a result, natives may react differently depending on whether migrants are perceived as economic competitors, humanitarian victims, temporary residents, or permanent settlers (Alrababa'h, Masterson, Casalis, Hangartner, & Weinstein, 2023; Beaman, Onder, & Onder, 2022; Dustmann & Görlach, 2016; Newman, Hartman, Lown, & Feldman, 2015). Much of what we know about these distinctions comes from survey experiments and conjoint designs that vary migrant attributes directly (Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Bansak, Hainmueller, & Hangartner, 2016; Valentino et al., 2019), rather than from observational evidence on how migration is experienced in local communities.

This paper contributes to the debate by turning to a newer and analytically advantageous setting, recent migration within Latin America. Since the early 2010s, a region traditionally characterised by emigration has experienced large-scale inflows from Venezuela and Haiti. As of May 2024, 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country (roughly 25.5% of the 2015 population)[1], and more than 78 percent have settled in Spanish-speaking neighbours (R4V, 2024). During the same period, over 650,000 Haitians left their country after the 2010 earthquake (UN, 2020), and a substantial share settled

[1]Based on World Bank population estimates for 2015: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?name_desc=true&locations=VE

in Chile, partly because, until 2018, Chile uniquely allowed visa-free entry for Haitian nationals.[2] As Figure 1 shows, the migrant population in Chile increased ten-fold in less than a decade, reaching nearly nine percent of the population by 2020.

Crucially for identifying mechanisms, Venezuelan and Haitian migrants differ sharply in attributes that theory identifies as politically relevant. Venezuelans share language, religion, and many cultural traits with Chileans, and they display substantial variation in skill levels. Haitians, by contrast, are overwhelmingly low skilled, speak Haitian Creole which is not mutually intelligible with Spanish, and are racially distinct from most of the native population. These flows arrived rapidly and recently, creating a setting in which economic and cultural dimensions of migration are less tightly bundled than in the long-standing immigration systems of Europe or the United States.

Chile is also a context of rising far-right mobilisation, a pattern mirrored in many democracies around the world, including Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey. The far-right *Partido Republicano*, which did not exist before 2015, received nearly 29% of the vote in the first round of the 2021 presidential election. This development raises a central question in the comparative literature: whether recent migration is contributing to the electoral success of exclusionary actors, or whether other political dynamics are at play. Addressing this question requires examining how migration shapes voting behaviour in places where migrants settle and become part of the local social and economic environment, rather than relying solely on aggregate national trends or attitudinal measures. Far-right mobilisation may still operate through fear, media narratives, or symbolic threat, making it essential to assess whether areas that experience greater migration are systematically more likely to support far-right candidates.

To answer this question, I combine administrative migration records by nationality with presidential election results measured at both the municipal and local labour market levels. I implement a shift-share instrumental variables strategy following Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001). Because migrants are not randomly allocated across Chilean localities, the instrument isolates variation driven by national-level inflow shocks interacting with historical settlement patterns that predate the recent migration waves.

The results show that immigration does not increase support for anti-immigrant far-right candidates in this new context. Instead, migration reduces far-right support and increases support for the centre-right. This pattern appears both in local labour markets, where concerns about job competition and public services should be most salient, and at the municipal level, where cultural visibility and everyday interaction are more pronounced. Culturally distant Haitian inflows do not generate a cultural-threat backlash and, once skill differences are held constant, are associated with lower far-right support. Across specifications, the centre-right consistently benefits, suggesting that voters con-

[2]Haitians could enter Chile as tourists and subsequently apply for work permits and residence, unlike in most other Latin American countries.

Figure 1: Distribution of Venezuelan and Haitian migrants by hosting country as of December 2022, and hosting countries migrant percent population from 1995 to 2020

(a) Distribution of Venezuelan and Haitian migrants by host country as of December 2022



(b) Trend of migrants as percent of population by country, 1990-2020



Source: Information compiled by R4V: Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela jointly led by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for Panel A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International Migrant Stock 2020, for Panel B.

cerned about migration may gravitate toward policy-oriented parties that promise control and order without endorsing radical exclusion. Turnout analyses indicate that these shifts reflect changes in partisan support rather than changes in participation.

Taken together, these findings indicate that recent migration to Chile has not translated into a far-right backlash in areas that experience higher migrant inflows. Rather than mechanically increasing support for exclusionary candidates, local exposure to migra-

tion appears to reorganise electoral competition within the right. This pattern is difficult to reconcile with accounts that treat immigration as an automatic trigger of far-right mobilisation, but it is consistent with the scope conditions emphasised earlier. When migration is recent and attitudes are still forming, local exposure may weaken exclusionary appeals through everyday interaction or familiarity, particularly when migrants are perceived as vulnerable. Moreover, in contexts where immigration-related concerns are framed less around redistribution and more around regulation, legality, and administrative control, voters may respond to migration by favouring parties that signal governing capacity rather than radical exclusion. Finally, where far-right actors have not fully consolidated ownership over immigration as a political issue, migration-related concerns may be expressed through shifts within the right-wing camp rather than through uniform gains for exclusionary parties.

This study advances the literature in three main ways. First, it provides new evidence on the relationship between migration and far-right voting in a Global South democracy where both large-scale immigration and far-right mobilisation are recent. By moving beyond the European and North American cases that dominate existing research, the paper speaks directly to the external validity of theories linking migration to far-right support and shows that such links are not inevitable in newer destination contexts. Second, by exploiting sharp differences in the characteristics of major migrant groups within the same national setting, the analysis offers clearer leverage on competing mechanisms than contexts in which economic disadvantage and cultural distance are tightly bundled. The contrasting effects of Venezuelan and Haitian inflows make it possible to assess whether labour market competition, cultural threat, or contact better explain electoral responses to migration. Third, the findings highlight the importance of political mediation in shaping the electoral consequences of migration. Even when migration becomes salient and far-right actors mobilise around exclusionary narratives, local exposure to migrants need not benefit the far-right if alternative political responses are available. This suggests that the electoral impact of migration depends not only on who migrates and where, but also on how migration-related concerns are articulated and absorbed within the party system, with broader implications for understanding when and why far-right mobilisation succeeds.

Understanding the mechanisms that connect migration to political behaviour is essential for designing policies that improve integration, reduce social tensions, and prevent the consolidation of xenophobic or exclusionary movements. This task is especially urgent in contexts where migration is recent, party systems are still adapting, and political responses to immigration are not yet fully institutionalised. The Chilean case, marked by unprecedented migration, rapid party-system transformation, and sharp variation in migrant characteristics, provides a rare opportunity to examine how local exposure to migration reshapes electoral competition before attitudes and political alignments fully

crystallise. By showing that migration can reorganise competition within the right rather than mechanically fuelling far-right mobilisation, the paper sheds light on a broader global challenge facing many democracies that are becoming migration destinations for the first time.

2 Background

2.1 Attitudes toward immigration: established mechanisms

The literature offers several explanations for why immigration elicits hostile or supportive reactions among natives, and how these attitudes may translate into political behaviour. Following Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010), these accounts are often organised around economic mechanisms, sociocultural considerations, and concerns related to public order and security. Other work highlights the role of interpersonal contact and humanitarian considerations in shaping attitudes toward migrants.

A first set of accounts emphasises job market competition. Drawing on Heckscher–Ohlin models, early work argues that natives fear wage losses and job displacement when migrants compete for similar positions (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Kessler, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Under this view, low-skilled natives should be particularly opposed to low-skilled immigration, and highly educated natives should be more hostile to high-skilled inflows. Empirical evidence, however, has challenged this simple mapping. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) show that there is a general preference for high-skilled migrants, regardless of natives' own skill levels. Other work suggests that labour market concerns are strongly sector specific rather than purely based on education. Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013) show for the United States that opposition to H1-B visas is concentrated in sectors where immigrants directly compete with natives. Similarly, Dancygier and Donnelly (2013) find that European natives employed in expanding sectors tend to support immigration more than those in declining sectors, indicating that perceptions of job scarcity in particular labour markets are central to the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes.

A second set of economic mechanisms is sociotropic. Here, natives worry less about their individual job prospects and more about the perceived burden of immigration on the state and public finances. Immigration may be associated with higher taxes, increased social spending, or concerns about the general state of the economy (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Valentino et al., 2019). The literature highlights several channels. One concerns fears that immigration worsens macroeconomic performance or increases fiscal costs (Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2007; Valentino et al., 2019). Another emphasises congestion of public goods such as health, education, and housing, concerns that may be particularly salient among low socioeconomic status natives in settings with limited provision (Colantone & Stanig, 2018;

Cremaschi et al., 2024; Dickson, Hobolt, De Vries, & Cremaschi, 2024; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010). Concerns over the distribution of scarce public resources, and perceptions of unfairness in access to them, may further politicise immigration even where labour market competition is limited, including through competition over public housing (Gennaro, 2025).

A third set of accounts focuses on ethnic and cultural threat. These approaches emphasise that attitudes toward migrants often reflect broader patterns of ethnocentrism and identity politics, and that natives may oppose immigration even when it does not represent a direct economic threat (Valentino et al., 2019). A large body of work in Western industrialised democracies documents persistent hostility toward culturally distant or visibly distinct groups (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Fetzer, 2000; McLaren, 2003; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Studies emphasise different dimensions of difference. Some focus on physical appearance and racial cues (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Lee & Ottati, 2002; Valentino et al., 2019), while others highlight language and religion, especially attitudes toward Muslim migrants in predominantly Christian societies (Adida, Lo, & Platas, 2019; Bansak et al., 2016; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015). Another strand stresses concerns that immigration may transform national culture in ways that natives perceive as threatening or incompatible with their values (Campbell, Wong, & Citrin, 2006; Card, Dustmann, & Preston, 2012; Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004).

A growing strand of work emphasises security concerns as a channel through which immigration may shape attitudes, alongside economic and sociocultural considerations. In this view, natives may oppose immigration because they perceive migrants, or particular migrant groups, as associated with crime, disorder, terrorism, or broader insecurity. Some studies examine whether migrant inflows change objective levels of crime or violence (Bianchi, Buonanno, & Pinotti, 2012; Bove & Böhmelt, 2016; Zhou & Shaver, 2021), while others stress that perceptions of threat often respond strongly to selective exposure, media coverage, and stereotypes, even in the absence of corresponding increases in crime (Fasani, Mastrobuoni, Owens, & Pinotti, 2019; Helbling & Meierrieks, 2022; Ward, 2019). Fasani et al. (2019) notes that in many countries natives are more concerned that immigrants increase crime than that they affect unemployment or taxes, and that these concerns frequently rest on misperceptions about both crime rates and the size of the migrant population. In Europe, fears about crime are a central dimension of anti-immigration attitudes (Bianchi et al., 2012) and have been linked to support for exclusionary and far-right parties (Dinas & van Spanje, 2011). In Chile, this channel has received direct attention in recent work evaluating the relationship between migration and crime, which finds no systematic link between migrant inflows and criminal activity, despite the prominence of security narratives in political debate (Ajzenman, Dominguez, & Undurraga,

2023).[3]

Finally, a further set of arguments highlights the role of contact and humanitarian considerations in shaping attitudes toward immigration. Building on Allport (1954), this literature argues that sustained, meaningful contact with migrants can reduce prejudice and increase support for inclusion. Direct interactions in workplaces, schools, and neighbourhoods may challenge stereotypes and lower perceived threat. Related work distinguishes exposure from contact, showing that the political consequences of hosting migrants depend on whether natives experience direct interaction rather than mere proximity (Steinmayr, 2021). In parallel, several studies show that humanitarian frames and information about persecution or conflict in sending countries can generate more favourable attitudes toward refugees and forced migrants (Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Bansak et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2015). Natives may be more willing to accept migrants when they are perceived as victims of violence, repression, or natural disasters.

Taken together, this literature identifies multiple pathways through which immigration may shape native attitudes. The next question is how these attitudinal responses translate into electoral outcomes, and whether relationships documented in long-standing immigration destinations travel to contexts where migration is more recent and political responses are still forming.

2.2 From attitudes to votes: immigration and far-right electoral support

A large body of research examines whether immigration affects electoral outcomes, especially support for far-right parties. Most of this evidence comes from Europe and North America, where immigration has been politically salient for decades and where far-right actors have often built durable electoral coalitions around nativist and exclusionary appeals (Barone et al., 2016; Caselli, Fracasso, & Traverso, 2021; Dinas, Matakos, Xefteris, & Hangartner, 2019; Edo, Giesing, Öztunc, & Poutvaara, 2019; Gerdes & Wadensjö, 2008; Mayda, Peri, & Steingress, 2022; Moriconi et al., 2022; Otto & Steinhardt, 2014; Vasilakis, 2018). These studies analyse cases such as the National Front in France and Vlaams Belang in Belgium (Edo et al., 2019), Brexit in the United Kingdom (Langella & Manning, 2016), and the election of Donald Trump in the United States (Mayda et al., 2022). The common premise is that local exposure to migrants can translate into electoral support for parties that mobilise around immigration.

Survey-based research complements this evidence by showing that anti-immigrant

[3]In Latin America more broadly, the association between migration and criminal violence is sometimes amplified by the involvement of gangs and cartels in irregular migration routes. For example, media coverage has reported interactions between Venezuelan migrants and Colombian armed groups in border regions. "Crisis in Venezuela: How Colombian mafias and armed groups are taking advantage of Venezuelan migrants," BBC Mundo.

attitudes are a strong predictor of far-right voting in both single-country and comparative settings (Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Cutts, Ford, & Goodwin, 2011; Kai, 2008; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Mughan & Paxton, 2006; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). These studies establish a robust individual-level link between exclusionary attitudes and support for far-right parties, suggesting that immigration-related concerns can be politically mobilised when appropriate electoral vehicles are available.

Early work related far-right vote shares to the size of local migrant populations and reached mixed conclusions. Some studies find that larger migrant shares are associated with higher support for far-right or radical right parties (Golder, 2003; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002; Swank & Betz, 2003). Others report no clear relationship (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008), or suggest that far-right parties perform better where minority groups remain relatively small (Bustikova, 2014). A central concern in this literature is endogeneity, since migrants are not randomly distributed across communities and often settle in areas with stronger labour markets, more tolerant populations, and distinct political trajectories (Cools et al., 2021; Golder, 2016).

More recent work therefore relies on research designs aimed at causal identification, including instrumental variables strategies and quasi-experimental approaches (Barone et al., 2016; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, & Piil Damm, 2019; Edo et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017; Moriconi et al., 2022; Otto & Steinhardt, 2014; Schaub, Gereke, & Baldassarri, 2021). Many of these studies find that immigration increases support for far-right or radical right parties, but the evidence also highlights substantial heterogeneity in both magnitude and mechanisms. Some contributions attribute effects to a combination of economic and cultural channels. For example, Barone et al. (2016) show that increases in the immigrant share in Italian municipalities raise support for the Lega Nord and interpret this as reflecting labour market competition, pressure on local services, and cultural distance. Edo et al. (2019) find that low-skilled immigration in France increases support for the National Front, especially when inflows originate from non-Western countries.

A related strand emphasises economic mechanisms more directly. Several studies argue that labour market and welfare-state concerns are central to far-right mobilisation (Bredtmann, 2022; Halla et al., 2017; Mayda et al., 2022; Pieroni, Roig, & Salmasi, 2023; Roupakias & Chletsos, 2020). For Austria, Halla et al. (2017) show that local immigration explains a non-trivial share of variation in support for the Freedom Party and interpret this effect as driven by fears of adverse labour market consequences. For the United States, Mayda et al. (2022) find that low-skilled immigration increases Republican vote shares, while high-skilled immigration has the opposite effect, consistent with job competition and fiscal concerns.

Another strand highlights cultural mechanisms, arguing that the composition of mi-

grant inflows, rather than their overall size, is crucial for understanding electoral effects (Brunner & Kuhn, 2018; Devillanova, 2021; Harmon, 2018; Mendez & Cutillas, 2014; Rozo & Vargas, 2021; Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016). Mendez and Cutillas (2014) show that in Spain, inflows from culturally similar Latin American countries increase support for left-wing parties, while migration from North Africa benefits the mainstream right. Brunner and Kuhn (2018) similarly find that culturally distant migration is more strongly associated with anti-immigrant voting.

At the same time, a growing set of studies reports null or even negative effects of immigration on far-right support (Gessler, Tóth, & Wachs, 2022; Hennig, 2021; Lonsky, 2021; Pagliacci & Bonacini, 2022; Russo, 2021; Usta, 2022; Vertier et al., 2023). Many interpret these patterns through contact mechanisms, arguing that sustained interpersonal interaction can weaken prejudice and reduce the appeal of exclusionary political appeals (Allport, 1954; Steinmayr, 2021). Much of this work focuses on refugee inflows, where humanitarian frames and reception arrangements may facilitate contact or sympathy. Vertier et al. (2023) show that the redistribution of asylum seekers across French municipalities reduced support for the National Front, particularly where reception centres were small. Only a few studies using general migration flows and shift-share instruments find negative effects on far-right parties (Lonsky, 2021; Pagliacci & Bonacini, 2022).

Taken together, existing research offers conflicting predictions. Economic and cultural threat accounts suggest that immigration, especially when low-skilled or culturally distant, should boost support for far-right parties. Contact and humanitarian mechanisms allow for the possibility that local exposure may temper hostility or even erode far-right support. Importantly, however, most of this evidence is drawn from contexts where immigration has long been politicised and where party systems already contain well-defined electoral vehicles for exclusionary reactions.

2.3 Why context matters: new migration destinations and political aggregation

The mixed evidence from Europe and North America suggests that the political consequences of immigration are not determined solely by the presence of migrants. Rather, they depend on how migration-related concerns are filtered through institutional settings, party systems, and state capacity. Existing theories and empirical regularities are largely built on a set of shared contextual features that characterise long-standing immigration destinations in the Global North. These contexts typically combine sustained immigration over long periods, high levels of state capacity and welfare provision, the presence of institutionalised far-right parties, and well-defined political cleavages organised around immigration. Within such environments, immigration has been politicised over extended periods, stereotypes and group boundaries have hardened, and far-right actors have often established ownership over immigration as a political issue, offering voters a clear

electoral option that links migration to cultural decline, economic threat, or insecurity (Golder, 2016; Mudde, 2019).

These conditions need not hold in newer migration destinations, particularly in emerging democracies. Where immigration is recent and rapid, attitudes toward migrants may be less crystallised and more responsive to local interaction. Lower state capacity and weaker welfare systems can further reshape how migration is perceived (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Valentino et al., 2019). In contexts characterised by high levels of labour informality, migrants may contribute little to public revenues through taxation, while still increasing demand for social services, housing, or public order. As a result, concerns about immigration may centre less on long-term redistribution and more on regulation, legality, and the ability of the state to manage inflows effectively. At the same time, party systems in these settings are often still adapting to immigration as a political issue. Far-right actors may be present, but they do not necessarily monopolise exclusionary appeals, and mainstream parties may retain credibility on issues of control and governance (Meguid, 2005).

Cultural considerations further complicate the comparison between long-standing and newer migration destinations. On the one hand, societies in the Global North may be more accustomed to cultural heterogeneity due to decades of immigration, which can make attitudes less responsive to marginal changes in migrant composition. On the other hand, migration to these countries often involves large cultural, linguistic, or religious distances, which can make cultural threat particularly salient when activated. In contrast, migration in the Global South frequently occurs between neighbouring countries and within regions, where cultural, religious, or linguistic differences may be less pronounced. In such contexts, cultural distance may be a weaker or more ambiguous trigger of exclusionary reactions, especially when migration is recent and everyday interaction is common.

Taken together, these features generate a set of conditional expectations that differ from those commonly derived from the Global North literature. Economic threat may matter more in settings with weak safety nets and informal labour markets, but it may also be politically redirected toward demands for regulation rather than exclusion. Cultural threat may be less deterministic when migrants are culturally proximate or when attitudes are still forming. Humanitarian considerations may persist longer when displacement is recent, visible, and framed as temporary or crisis-driven. Security concerns, while potentially salient, may focus attention on state capacity, border control, and enforcement rather than on support for far-right parties per se. Since these contextual features shape both attitudes and the political options available to voters, I expect the link between immigration and far-right support to be more contingent and mediated in newer migration destinations than in long-established ones.

This perspective implies that the mapping from immigration to attitudes, and from

attitudes to votes, is context-dependent rather than mechanical. The same underlying concerns about jobs, culture, or security may be expressed through different political channels depending on which parties are perceived as capable of responding to them. As a result, immigration may shift support within the party system, particularly within the right, rather than uniformly benefiting far-right actors.

2.4 Party competition and immigration in Chile

Chile exemplifies many features of a new migration destination in an emerging democratic context. Large-scale immigration is a recent phenomenon, and the speed of demographic change has outpaced the development of stable political cleavages around migration. At the same time, Chile combines a growing but fiscally constrained welfare system, decreasing but persistent labour market informality, and a party system that, despite more than three decades of democratic competition, is still adapting to new social and political challenges. Historically understood as a culturally homogeneous society, Chile has experienced a rapid diversification of its population without a corresponding consolidation of political routines or partisan alignments around immigration.

As in other emerging democracies that have recently become migration destinations, these structural features are likely to shape how immigration enters political competition. Immigration has become a salient political issue, and parties across the right have sought to articulate the concerns and anxieties it provokes.[4] Yet, despite the salience of the issue, far-right ownership over immigration may remain incomplete. The recency of large-scale migration, combined with the absence of long-standing exclusionary cleavages, may limit the extent to which anti-immigrant attitudes consolidate into a stable and exclusive electoral base. At the same time, centre-right parties may actively contest the issue by advancing policy-based responses centred on regulation, enforcement, and state capacity, rather than adopting overtly exclusionary rhetoric. Under these conditions, immigration may be less likely to be monopolised by the far-right than in many long-standing immigration destinations, where exclusionary frames have hardened over time and far-right parties have become the dominant electoral vehicle for migration-related discontent.

Within this competitive environment, far-right actors have nevertheless placed immigration at the centre of their discourse, portraying recent inflows as a source of disorder, criminality, and cultural incongruity. This strategy aligns with broader comparative patterns in which far-right parties mobilise around nativism and the protection of an essentialised national community (Mudde, 2019; Pirro, 2023). In Chile, far-right leaders have emphasised precisely these themes, drawing explicit links between migration, organised crime, and a breakdown of social order.[5]

[4]See Appendix A for evidence from the Manifesto Project coding of immigration-related statements in Chilean party platforms.

[5]For example, far-right leaders frequently link crime policy to migration policy. One illustration is

The mainstream centre-right, by contrast, has adopted a more complex and policy-oriented stance. Its rhetoric is more moderate, yet it has combined this moderation with concrete and visible interventions aimed at managing migration and reasserting state control. As the governing coalition during the 2017 and 2021 election cycles, the centre-right introduced reforms requiring visa applications to be initiated abroad, created new residence categories, enabled expedited expulsions, and introduced the Democratic Responsibility Visa for Venezuelan nationals.[6] At the same time, it maintained a generally pro-migration discourse toward Venezuelans, justified in part by ideological opposition to the Venezuelan authoritarian regime.[7] These combined signals allowed the centre-right to position itself as capable of restoring order without embracing the far-right's more radical framing.

This pattern of competition has important implications for how immigration translates into electoral outcomes. In contexts where welfare provision is constrained, labour markets remain partially informal, and party systems are still consolidating, concerns about immigration may be channelled toward demands for regulation and control rather than toward outright exclusion. Voters who prioritise order and governance, but are wary of extreme positions, may therefore gravitate toward centre-right parties rather than toward far-right actors. I therefore expect that, in Chile and in other emerging democracies facing recent migration shocks, immigration is more likely to reallocate support within the right-wing camp than to generate uniform gains for exclusionary parties.

The empirical analysis that follows evaluates these competing expectations by examining how recent migration shapes electoral outcomes across two spatial scales that correspond to distinct mechanisms. At the level of local labour markets, where migrants and natives are more likely to compete for similar types of work, migration may activate economic concerns related to job competition, distributive strain, or pressure on local services. At the municipal level, where migrants are more visible in everyday life and social interaction is more likely, migration may instead operate through cultural perceptions or interpersonal contact. By exploiting sharp differences in the characteristics of major migrant groups in Chile, particularly variation in skill levels and cultural proximity, the analysis assesses whether migration strengthens support for far-right candidates, shifts support toward more moderate right-wing parties, or has limited electoral effects. In doing so, it evaluates whether economic competition, cultural threat, or contact best account for the political consequences of recent migration in Chile.

the Republican Party's announcement of the plan "Cero Narcotráfico" to complement the fight against organised crime and irregular migration; see https://partidorepublicanodechile.cl.

[6]Presidential address announcing the reform: https://prensa.presidencia.cl.

[7]For example, President Piñera stated "Vamos a seguir recibiendo venezolanos en Chile" in an interview with Deutsche Welle; see https://www.dw.com/es.

3 Data and Data description

This study combines administrative and census data to examine how migration shaped electoral outcomes in the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections in Chile. The analysis relies on three primary sources: individual-level immigration records from the National Migration Service, population and demographic data from the National Statistics Institute (INE), and municipal-level electoral results from the Electoral Service (SERVEL).

Migration to Chile To measure the magnitude and composition of migration at the local level, I use administrative records on 1,826,719[8] visa applications to the National Migration Service of the Chilean Department of State from 2000 to 2021. These records include basic demographic information such as nationality, date of birth, municipality of residence, gender, occupation, educational level, and date of the application. To account for the initial migration shares, I use the 2002 Population and Housing Census prepared by INE as a baseline. Conducted in April 2002, the census recorded 187,521 migrants among the 15.1 million Chileans, incorporating variables such as education, age, and year of arrival. Figure 2a shows the stock of migrants for the two main migratory waves of the last 15 years. Following the 2017 election, immigration restrictions were established for the Haitian population, stopping their entry into the country. To compute the shares of migrant populations, I use yearly municipal population estimates reported by INE for the years 2000-2035, based on projections from census data.

Skill Level The census and migration records include self-reported educational attainment for each applicant. I classify migrants as high-skilled if they have completed any form of higher education, and as low-skilled if they have completed only primary or secondary schooling. Because educational information is missing for 682,067 individuals, I impute missing values using the multiple imputation methodology described by Rubin (1987, 2018). The imputation model incorporates gender, age, country of origin, occupation, professional activity, year of arrival, and municipality of residence. Figure 2b illustrates the evolution of migrant stocks by nationality and by skill level.

Local labour markets To study economic mechanisms such as labour market competition, I complement the municipal data with a second level of geographic aggregation based on local labour markets. These units correspond to the *Areas Funcionales de Trabajo* constructed by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in collaboration with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development of Chile (Minvu). Their definition follows the OECD functional urban area methodology (OECD, 2012), which identifies integrated

[8]The original dataset contains 2,674,391 visa applications. I removed duplicates based on nationality, date of birth, gender, education, occupation, and professional activity. Also, the dataset contains 749,729 permanent residence permits granted to foreigners who have remained in the country for at least 12 months with a temporary visa.

Figure 2: Stock of Migrants by Nationality (2001 - 2021)

(a) Venezuelan and Haitian Migrant Stock



(b) Migration Stock by skill levels



Source: Author´s calculation using the visa and permanent resident requirement dataset from the Chilean Department of State (National Migration Service) 2000 - 2021.

labour markets by combining population density with commuting flows. This method groups municipalities that share common labour dynamics regardless of administrative boundaries. Using these functional areas allows the analysis to capture the spatial scale at which labour market competition is likely to occur and it complements the municipal-level analysis that focuses on neighbourhood composition and cultural exposure.

Party Families and Outcome Construction To classify political actors into coherent ideological coalitions, I rely on the party family typology of the Manifesto Project, which groups parties according to their programmatic profiles and long-term ideological commitments (Manifesto Project, 2011). Appendix A provides the detailed mapping be-

tween Chilean parties and the corresponding Manifesto Project families. Based on this classification, I distinguish four electoral coalitions. The centre-right corresponds to *Chile Vamos*, a coalition placed within the Conservative party family. The left-wing coalition aggregates the parties in the former *Nueva Mayoría* coalition together with *Frente Amplio*, which the Manifesto Project categorises in the Socialist and Social Democratic families. The far-right bloc consists of the *Republican Party* and *Partido Social Cristiano*, classified as part of the Nationalist and Radical Right family. Finally, I group the remaining candidates in an "other parties" category that includes small, personalistic, and locally anchored movements that do not map cleanly onto any established party family. These four blocs form the basis of the vote-share outcomes used throughout the analysis.

Party Ideology To characterise the ideological positions of Chilean political parties, and particularly their stance toward migration, I draw on the Manifesto Project's coding of the 2017 and 2021 elections. The Manifesto Project analyzes parties' manifestos and records their emphasis on specific policy themes, including immigration, on a left–right policy index. Appendix Table A.1 shows that the Republican Party is the only actor that expressed anti-immigration rhetoric in both elections, with a score of 1.19. In 2021, the centre-right coalition also incorporated a small amount of anti-immigration rhetoric, recorded as 0.09 on the same index, while the parties in the left-wing bloc expressed exclusively positive or inclusionary positions on migrants. These programme-based differences provide a clear rationale for analysing vote shares separately for the far-right, the centre-right, the left-wing, and the set of other parties.

Election Results Electoral outcomes are measured using the first-round results from the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections published by the Electoral Service (SERVEL). The 2017 election marks the first appearance of a far-right presidential candidate, José Antonio Kast, who led a new coalition distinct from the traditional centre-right alliance headed by Sebastián Piñera[9]. For each municipality or local labour market, I compute turnout and vote shares for the far-right, centre-right, left-wing coalition, and other parties. This structure allows the analysis to capture how migration relates to support for established coalitions and for non-traditional political actors. Descriptive statistics for these electoral variables are presented in Table 1.

Municipal Characteristics To examine heterogeneous effects and include relevant controls, I use demographic information from the National Statistics Institute. These data include municipal-level age distributions and the proportion of women. From these variables I construct an elderly dependency rate, defined as the ratio of the population aged sixty and older to the population aged fourteen and younger in each municipality. Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1.

[9]The Chilean political system is a presidential system, so the leaders of the coalitions are not necessarily the party presidents, but rather the presidential candidates.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Municipality

Variable	2017				2021			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcome								
Far-right vote (%)	7.98	2.93	1.19	30.56	27.36	8.18	11.57	72.34
Center-right vote (%)	36.05	8.49	23.05	74.10	12.35	4.52	1.10	34.35
Left-wing vote (%)	55.10	8.82	18.70	71.97	45.41	9.81	4.42	64.04
Other parties vote (%)	0.87	0.42	0.00	5.56	14.88	7.29	0.60	60.43
Turnout (%)	46.69	5.26	11.31	69.09	47.38	5.62	19.07	69.27
Migration								
Migration (%)	6.41	8.41	0.08	62.28	9.84	10.76	0.12	62.90
Hispanic migration (%)	5.25	7.41	0.04	61.92	8.00	9.85	0.06	62.19
Haitian migration (%)	0.43	0.73	0.00	4.41	1.06	1.22	0.00	5.95
Low-skilled migration (%)	4.41	5.80	0.00	56.94	6.55	7.05	0.00	57.24
High-skilled migration (%)	1.34	2.01	0.00	10.01	2.17	2.77	0.02	14.48
Controls and Municipal Characteristics								
Population	182,847	151,824	123	604,744	199,492	165,264	141	655,033
Aging rate	83.35	23.77	19.96	360.00	95.78	28.03	24.67	343.75
Women (%)	50.73	0.65	36.36	51.89	50.66	0.67	34.75	52.23

Source: Electoral results dataset for the presidential elections of 2017 and 2021 from the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL), visa applications dataset from the Chilean Department of State (National Migration Service), Population projections 2000-2035 from the National Statistics Institute (INE). Ageing rate corresponds to the proportion of 60 years old or older, over the young 14 years old or younger in a given municipality. Author's calculation by municipality (346).

4 Methods

This study examines how exposure to immigration affects electoral outcomes in Chile. I follow two complementary identification strategies. First, I estimate a set of linear models that describe the association between local migration and voting patterns. Second, I apply an instrumental variables approach that uses historical migrant settlement and national-level inflow shocks to generate plausibly exogenous variation in local migrant exposure. The analysis is conducted at two levels of geographic aggregation. I begin with local labour markets to assess whether migration driven by economic factors, such as competition in the workplace, shifts electoral behaviour. I then turn to municipalities, which capture neighbourhood composition, cultural exposure, and other social mechanisms that operate at a finer spatial scale.

4.1 Benchmark linear model

Local labour markets I first examine whether changes in the share of immigrants within local labour markets affect voting outcomes. Labour markets capture the relevant geographic unit for economic competition, as workers are mobile across municipalities within the same commuting zone and employers recruit from a shared pool of potential

employees. For each labour market l and election year t, I estimate:

$$y_{lt} = \beta migr_{lt} + \rho_l + \rho_t + \gamma X_{lt} + \epsilon_{lt} \tag{1}$$

Where y_{lt} is the vote share for a given political coalition in labour market l; $migr_{lt}$ is the share of migrants in the local labour market population; ρ_l and ρ_t are labour market and year fixed effects; X_{lt} is a vector of demographic controls at the local level, and ϵ_{lt} is the error term. The coefficient β captures the conditional correlation between local migration levels and electoral outcomes.

To explore distributional effects, I decompose overall migration into high-skilled and low-skilled components. This decomposition follows the literature on labour market competition, which predicts stronger native reactions when migrants and natives compete for similar types of jobs. I estimate the same model with skill-specific migrant shares both separately and jointly.

Municipalities I next examine the effects of migration at the municipal level. Municipalities capture mechanisms related to neighbourhood composition, cultural diversity, and everyday social interactions that cannot be observed at the scale of local labour markets. For each municipality m and year t, I estimate:

$$y_{mt} = \beta migr_{mt} + \rho_m + \rho_t + \gamma X_{mt} + \epsilon_{mt} \tag{2}$$

Where all variables are defined analogously. These models provide descriptive evidence on how aggregate migration relates to voting outcomes and on how these relationships vary across settings of different cultural exposure.

To examine whether cultural distance shapes native reactions, I separate migration into two components. The first captures inflows from culturally similar countries, primarily Spanish-speaking Latin American origins. The second captures inflows from culturally different countries, with the Haitian migration wave as the dominant example. I estimate models using each component separately, and then jointly, to identify which type of migrant inflow is more strongly associated with electoral shifts.

4.2 Causal Identification and IV model

Although the benchmark regressions provide an informative description of the data, migrant settlement patterns are not random. Migrants may choose to locate in areas with better economic opportunities, more accessible public services, or more welcoming political environments. These factors may also correlate with voting behaviour, which complicates any causal interpretation.

To address this issue, I use a shift–share instrumental variables strategy following the logic of Altonji and Card (1991), Card (2001) and the subsequent literature. The approach exploits two sources of variation. The first is the historical geographic distribution of migrants across Chile. The second is the national-level change in the number of migrants from each origin country between 2017 and 2021, a period characterized by large and plausibly exogenous supply-driven outflows from several sending countries. The instrument has predictive power because new migrants are likely to settle where earlier cohorts from the same origin were already present, and the shift component captures changes in national inflows that are driven primarily by conditions in the sending countries rather than by local political dynamics within Chile.

General construction

The instrumental variables strategy builds on the first-difference version of equations 1 and 2. For each geographic unit u, defined as either a local labour market or a municipality, I take within-unit differences in the migrant share between the 2017 and 2021 elections. Let $\Delta migr_u$ denote this change. The goal is to isolate the component of $\Delta migr_u$ that is driven by national inflow shocks rather than by local characteristics. Following the logic of Card (2001), I decompose changes in local migrant shares into nationality-specific components.

Let $\Delta migr_u^n$ be the change in the share of migrants from origin country n in unit u between the two elections. This change can be written as a weighted sum of nationality-specific shifts:

$$\Delta migr_u = \sum_n \theta_{u,2008}^n \cdot \Delta migr_u^n \tag{3}$$

Where $\theta_{u,2008}^n$ is the share of all migrants from origin n who lived in unit u in 2008. Formally,

$$\theta_{u,2008}^n = \frac{MIGR_{u,2008}^n}{\sum_u MIGR_{u,2008}^n}$$

Which allocates to each unit the proportion of migrants from origin n who resided there before the main migration waves. This decomposition separates the influence of the historical settlement pattern from the contemporaneous shifts in migration.

The instrument replaces the local shift $\Delta migr_u^n$ with the national-level shift for that origin, denoted $\Delta migr_{2017-2021}^n$. The predicted change in the migrant share in unit u is therefore:

$$\widehat{\Delta migr_u} = \sum_n \theta_{u,2008}^n \cdot \Delta migr_{2017-2021}^n \tag{4}$$

This construction predicts local inflows by combining the pre-existing geographic distribution of migrants with national inflow shocks from each origin. Since the shocks are measured at the national level, they cannot be driven by local economic or political conditions. This provides a source of plausibly exogenous variation in the change in migrant exposure across Chilean localities.

In constructing the instrument, I include the 35 Latin American and other major origin countries that account for the largest migrant populations in Chile in 2021 [10]. Although Chile receives migrants from more than 160 origins, this set accounts for more than 95.4% of the migrant population in 2021 and therefore captures the full extent of the inflow shocks relevant for the period under study.

Skill-specific instruments for labour markets

To study whether labour market competition drives electoral responses to immigration, I construct separate instruments for high-skilled and low-skilled migrant inflows. This approach follows recent applications such as Moriconi et al. (2022) and Mayda et al. (2022), who distinguish between different types of migrants in order to isolate heterogeneous effects on political outcomes.

Let $\theta^{n,HS}_{l,2008}$ and $\theta^{n,LS}_{l,2008}$ be the shares of high-skilled and low-skilled migrants from origin country n residing in labour market l in 2008, and let $\Delta migr^{n,HS}_{2017-2021}$ and $\Delta migr^{n,LS}_{2017-2021}$ be the corresponding national-level changes for each skill group. Using the same logic as in the general shift–share instrument, I construct two predicted inflows:

$$\Delta\widehat{migr}_l^{HS} = \sum_n \theta^{n,HS}_{l,2008} \cdot \Delta migr^{n,HS}_{(2017-2021)}$$

$$\Delta\widehat{migr}_l^{LS} = \sum_n \theta^{n,LS}_{l,2008} \cdot \Delta migr^{n,LS}_{(2017-2021)}$$

These instruments allow me to examine whether exposure to migrants who are more likely to compete with natives for similar jobs produces distinct electoral effects. High-skilled inflows and low-skilled inflows may generate different reactions among native workers, and separating these components provides a way to estimate these heterogeneous responses within a unified framework.

Cultural-specific instruments for municipalities

To examine whether cultural proximity or cultural distance shapes electoral reactions to immigration, I decompose the general shift–share instrument into two culturally de-

[10] These are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela

fined components, which test whether culturally distinct migrant groups trigger different political responses.

Let $\theta^{Sim}_{m,2008}$ represent the share of migrants from culturally similar origins who lived in municipality m in 2008. This group includes migrants from Spanish-speaking Iberian American countries whose linguistic and cultural backgrounds are relatively close to those of native Chileans. Let $\Delta migr^{Sim}_{2017-2021}$ be the corresponding national-level inflow change for this group. The predicted inflow of culturally similar migrants is:

$$\widehat{\Delta migr}^{Sim}_{m} = \sum_{n} \theta^{n,Sim}_{m,2008} \cdot \Delta migr^{n,Sim}_{(2017-2021)}$$

For the culturally distinct group, I focus specifically on migration from Haiti, which represents a clear cultural and linguistic contrast with the native population. Let $\theta^{Hai}_{m,2008}$ be the share of Haitian migrants residing in municipality m in 2008, and let $\Delta migr^{Hai}_{2017-2021}$ be the national-level change in the Haitian migrant population. The predicted inflow is:

$$\widehat{\Delta migr}^{Hai}_{m} = \theta^{Hai}_{m,2008} \cdot \Delta migr^{Hai}_{(2017-2021)}$$

These two instruments allow for direct comparison of the electoral effects of exposure to migrants from culturally similar origins and exposure to migrants from Haiti, the main culturally distinct inflow during this period.

4.3 Validity of the IV Shift-Share Model

The internal validity of the shift–share design depends on the assumption that the pre-existing migrant shares are exogenous to later changes in electoral outcomes. Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2020) show that Bartik or shift–share estimators can be written as a generalized method of moments estimator in which the local shares act as the instruments, while the national shocks operate as weights. In this formulation, identification relies on the exogeneity of the shares rather than the shocks themselves. When a pre-period is available, this requirement is equivalent to a difference in differences assumption, where the pre-period shares capture differential exposure to a common subsequent shock. Testing whether those shares predict differential pre-trends in the outcome therefore becomes central to establishing internal validity.

Following their recommendations, I begin by computing the Rotemberg weights for each origin-specific component of the instrument. These weights measure the proportional contribution of each origin country to the identifying variation. The results, presented in Appendix G Table G.11, show that a small set of origins accounts for almost all the identifying variation. Venezuela and Haiti receive the largest weights, followed by Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. All remaining countries contribute only marginally, which helps

isolate the origins whose pre-trends are most important to examine.

Using these weights as guidance, I test whether the 2008 migrant shares predict electoral changes before the start of the period analysed in the main models. Specifically, I regress changes in presidential vote shares in the 2005 election, as well as changes between 1989 and 2005, on the main shift–share instrument and the origin-specific shares that receive the highest Rotemberg weights. These regressions include the same controls used in the main specifications. The results for cities and municipalities are reported in Appendix Tables G.12 and G.13. Across all outcomes, the coefficients on the overall instrument and on the key origin-specific shares are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. There is no evidence that areas with higher initial exposure to Venezuelan, Haitian, Peruvian, or other large migrant groups experienced different political trends in the pre-treatment period.

Taken together, the Rotemberg weights and the absence of discernible pre-trends provide strong support for the identifying assumption. The 2008 migrant shares do not predict earlier changes in voting behaviour, which indicates that they influence later electoral outcomes primarily through differential exposure to the post-2017 immigration shocks. These findings strengthen confidence in the internal validity of the shift–share strategy used in this study.

5 Findings

5.1 Benchmark Findings

Before turning to the instrumental variables strategy, I begin by examining the association between migration and electoral outcomes using the two-way fixed effects specification in Equation 1. Table 2 reports the estimates for local labour markets in Panel A and for municipalities in Panel B. The migration ratio is standardized, so the coefficients capture the change in vote share associated with a one standard deviation increase in the migrant share.

Across both local labour markets and municipalities, higher migration is consistently associated with lower support for the far-right. The estimated coefficients are sizeable in both panels and remain relatively stable when demographic controls are added. At the municipal level, for example, a one standard deviation increase in the migrant share is associated with roughly a five percentage point decline in the far-right vote. The centre-right coalition shows no clear pattern in response to migration. Coefficients are small in magnitude in both levels of aggregation, suggesting that changes in the migrant share do not meaningfully shift support toward the traditional right.

For the left-wing parties, the estimates also point to a negative association with migration. Although the magnitudes are smaller than for the far-right, municipalities

Table 2: Two-way fixed effects model: Vote share & General Migration

Panel A: Local Labour Markets

	Far-Right		Center-Right		Left-Wing		Other	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Migration Ratio	-0.070***	-0.054**	0.019	0.014	-0.054***	-0.043***	0.105***	0.082***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Observations	570	570	570	570	570	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.900	0.905	0.944	0.945	0.756	0.767	0.819	0.845
N° of IDs	285	285	285	285	285	285	285	285
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Panel B: Municipalities

	Far-Right		Center-Right		Left-Wing		Other	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Migration Ratio	-0.079***	-0.051**	0.042*	0.016	-0.030**	-0.033**	0.067***	0.068***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Observations	690	690	690	690	690	690	690	690
Adjusted R^2	0.889	0.897	0.934	0.940	0.746	0.767	0.792	0.828
N° of IDs	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports estimates from two-way fixed effects regressions for the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections (Equation 1). The dependent variable is the vote share of each political bloc in a given year. The main independent variable is the migration ratio, defined as the share of immigrants in the local population, then standardized. Panel A presents results at the level of local labour markets; Panel B presents results at the municipality level. All models include year fixed effects and unit fixed effects. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each locality. Robust standard errors clustered at the appropriate geographic level are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

and labour markets with higher migrant shares tend to display lower support for left-wing candidates. In contrast, the vote for other parties moves in the opposite direction. The estimates for this group are consistently positive and comparatively large, indicating that neighbourhoods receiving larger migrant inflows may shift their support away from established party coalitions and toward independent or minor candidates who fall outside the traditional party families.

Appendix B provides additional evidence on how these associations vary with the composition of migration. Appendix Table B.2 separates migration into high-skilled and low-skilled inflows. High-skilled migration is associated with increases in both centre-right and left-wing vote shares and with declines in support for non-traditional parties, while the far-right shows little systematic response. Low-skilled migration presents a different pattern. The estimates point to lower left-wing support and substantially higher support for parties outside the main party families, along with modest declines in the far-right

vote.

These contrasting patterns may reflect different mechanisms linked to the skill composition of incoming migrants. Locations that attract more high-skilled immigrants are often economically dynamic and socially integrated, which may reinforce support for the mainstream coalitions on both the centre-right and the left. In contrast, increases in low-skilled migration may intensify perceptions of labour market competition or strain in local services, which could weaken support for established coalitions and redirect votes toward non-traditional options. Although these benchmark correlations do not identify causal channels, they suggest that the political consequences of migration vary not only with its scale but also with its composition.

Appendix Table B.3 examines heterogeneity by cultural proximity. Hispanic migration, which captures inflows from Spanish-speaking Iberian American countries, is negatively associated with support for both the far-right and the left-wing, and positively associated with support for non-traditional parties. Haitian migration shows a distinct pattern. Areas with larger increases in Haitian inflows tend to exhibit lower far-right support and modestly higher vote shares for both mainstream coalitions on the centre-right and the left-wing, together with declines in support for parties outside the main party families. These differences by cultural proximity indicate that voters may react not only to the volume of incoming migration but also to the social and cultural profile of the new arrivals.

Taken together, these benchmark correlations show that migrant inflows are associated with electoral shifts away from the far-right and, to a lesser extent, away from the left-wing, and toward parties outside the dominant coalitions. At the same time, these patterns rely on observational variation and may reflect non-random settlement choices by migrants. For this reason, the next section turns to the shift–share instrumental variables strategy to estimate the causal effect of migration on electoral outcomes.

5.2 IV Estimation Findings

The instrumental variables strategy offers a way to assess the research question while accounting for the concerns of self-selection and reverse causality raised in the previous section. Using a shift–share design, I exploit historical settlement patterns and national inflow shocks to isolate changes in migrant exposure that are plausibly unrelated to local political dynamics. I begin with results at the level of local labour markets, a spatial scale that may reveal whether migration is interpreted through job market competition and whether this channel helps explain the electoral patterns observed. I then analyse results at the municipal level, a finer territorial scale that captures neighbourhood level interactions and cultural proximity between natives and migrants. Finally, I examine turnout to assess the extent to which the electoral changes identified in the analysis

Table 3: 2SLS model: Migration changes and vote share changes in local labour markets

Dependent Variable % vote	Models		
	OLS	**IV**	**IV - Control**
Panel A: Far right			
Migration ratio change	-0.0235***	-0.0458***	-0.0397***
	(0.00636)	(0.00502)	(0.00505)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	285	285	285
Panel B: Center right			
Migration ratio change	0.00518	0.0612***	0.0599***
	(0.00717)	(0.00654)	(0.00592)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	285	285	285
Panel C: Left wing			
Migration ratio change	-0.0192***	0.0151	0.0195
	(0.00403)	(0.0135)	(0.0127)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	285	285	285
Panel D: Other			
Migration ratio change	0.0375***	-0.0304	-0.0398**
	(0.00591)	(0.0196)	(0.0175)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	285	285	285
Panel E: First stage regression			
Endogenous variable: Migration ratio change			
Instrument		3.32e-06***	3.16e-06***
		(6.97e-07)	(6.01e-07)
F-Test		22.71	27.65
Partial R^2		0.0111	0.0115

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variable is the migration ratio change, defined as the change in the number of immigrants divided by the local population and standardize standardized. The shift–share instrument is constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the level of local labour markets. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each labour market in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

reflect shifts in political preferences or increases in political participation.

Table 4: 2SLS model: Skilled migration changes and Right-Wing vote share changes in local labour markets

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Panel A: Far right				
High-skilled migrant share	-0.00952	-0.0198***		-0.0147**
	(0.00696)	(0.00278)		(0.00662)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0132		-0.0551***	-0.0156
	(0.00885)		(0.00752)	(0.0183)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel B: Center right				
High-skilled migrant share	0.0242***	0.0316***		0.0394***
	(0.00682)	(0.00220)		(0.00554)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0106		0.0820***	-0.0237
	(0.00867)		(0.0129)	(0.0153)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variables: High-skilled and Low-skilled migrant share				
Instrument for high-skilled		2.43e-05***		-0.000135
		(2.55e-06)		(0.000111)
Instrument for low-skilled			3.68e-06***	0.000152***
			(9.42e-07)	(2.89e-05)
F-Test		90.55	15.28	8.940
Partial R^2		0.0407	0.00592	
Partial R^2 (High-skilled)				0.0467
Partial R^2 (Low-skilled)				0.0383

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in high-skilled and low-skilled migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the high-skilled migrant share and the low-skilled migrant share, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants in the corresponding skill group divided by the local population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the level of local labour markets. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each labour market in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Local labour markets

Table 3 reports the instrumental variables estimates for changes in the migrant share at the level of local labour markets. The results suggest that, once migrant sorting is addressed, larger migrant inflows are associated with a marked decline in support for the far-right. A one standard deviation increase in the migrant share is linked to a reduction of roughly four percentage points in the far-right vote. In contrast, the centre-right coalition appears to benefit from immigration. The estimated effect is close to six percentage points, indicating that inflows into local job markets may strengthen support for the mainstream right. In general, migration increases support for the broader right-wing coalition but

reshapes its internal composition by shifting votes away from the far-right and toward the centre-right. These findings run counter to Hypothesis 1, which posited that increases in the local migrant share would strengthen far-right support, and instead suggest that in Chile the political consequences of migration operate primarily within the right by reallocating votes from more exclusionary to more moderate right-wing options.

For the left-wing coalition, the estimates suggest that they are largely unaffected by migration inflows. Parties outside the traditional party families, however, tend to lose support as immigration increases, with estimates pointing to a decline of roughly four percentage points. Overall, the labour market results imply that migration does not produce a uniform reaction across coalitions but instead redistributes support within the right and weakens non-traditional electoral alternatives.

To explore whether these patterns vary with the composition of migration, Table 4 separates inflows into high-skilled and low-skilled components. The estimates show that both types of inflows are associated with reductions in far-right support, although the magnitudes differ. Instrumented high-skilled inflows are associated with modest declines in the far-right vote and clear gains for the centre-right coalition. Instrumented low-skilled inflows produce larger shifts: a one standard deviation increase in the low-skilled migrant share is associated with a sizeable reduction in far-right support and a marked increase in votes for the centre-right. These patterns are consistent with the idea, highlighted by Halla et al. (2017), Moriconi et al. (2022), and Mayda et al. (2022), that native reactions to migration may depend on perceived pressures in the labour market and in local services, which tend to be more salient when inflows are low-skilled. The results for the left-wing and for parties outside the traditional families are reported in Appendix Table C.4, since the political agenda around migration has been more central to the far-right and centre-right coalitions.

When both high-skilled and low-skilled inflows are instrumented jointly, the estimates suggest that labour markets attracting high-skilled migrants may be "winner" locations, where economic dynamism and the integration of skilled newcomers reinforce support for mainstream coalitions, particularly the centre-right and, to a lesser extent, the left. Low-skilled inflows, in contrast, may raise concerns about labour market competition and strain on local services, weakening far-right and left-wing support while benefiting the centre-right and, at times, non-traditional parties. The joint specification should be interpreted with caution, however, because the first-stage relation for low-skilled migration is relatively weak, with an F statistic of around nine. Even so, the overall pattern across models indicates that the political consequences of migration in local labour markets depend strongly on the skill profile of the incoming population.

Table 5: 2SLS model: Migration changes and vote share changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % vote	Models		
	OLS	**IV**	**IV - Control**
Panel A: Far right			
Migration ratio change	-0.0211***	-0.0147	-0.0124
	(0.00510)	(0.0158)	(0.0129)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right			
Migration ratio change	0.0120**	0.0344**	0.0307**
	(0.00525)	(0.0143)	(0.0125)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel C: Left wing			
Migration ratio change	-0.00730	0.0180**	0.0166***
	(0.00468)	(0.00907)	(0.00638)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel D: Other			
Migration ratio change	0.0164**	-0.0376**	-0.0349***
	(0.00818)	(0.0182)	(0.0123)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regression			
Endogenous variable: Migration ratio change			
Instrument		4.60e-05***	4.77e-05***
		(1.71e-05)	(1.62e-05)
F-Test		7.238	8.697
Partial R^2		0.124	0.140

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variable is the migration ratio change, defined as the change in the number of immigrants divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instrument is constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Municipalities

Table 5 presents the instrumental variables estimates at the municipal level. Unlike labour markets, which aggregate economic interactions, municipalities offer a finer territorial scale

Table 6: 2SLS model: Migration changes by origin and Right-Wing vote share changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Panel A: Far right				
Migrant share Hispanic	-0.0124***	-0.00703		-0.0109
	(0.00470)	(0.0129)		(0.0116)
Migrant share Haiti	-0.0144***		-0.0447**	-0.0333***
	(0.00438)		(0.0220)	(0.0123)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right				
Migrant share Hispanic	0.00424	0.0251**		0.0289**
	(0.00558)	(0.0107)		(0.0119)
Migrant share Haiti	0.0186***		0.0630*	0.0329***
	(0.00406)		(0.0332)	(0.00901)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variable: Migrant share of Hispanic countries and Haiti				
Instrument Hispanic		5.95e-05**		5.65e-05**
		(2.31e-05)		(2.32e-05)
Instrument Haiti			7.22e-05***	9.03e-05***
			(1.02e-05)	(1.15e-05)
F-Test		6.626	50.27	18.85
Partial R^2		0.148	0.0297	
Partial R^2 (Hispanic)				0.150
Partial R^2 (Haiti)				0.0423

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration from Hispanic countries and Haiti on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the migrant share from Hispanic countries and the migrant share from Haiti, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants from the corresponding origin group divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

where neighbourhood composition and everyday exposure to migrants are more likely to shape political perceptions. Here, the IV estimates suggest that changes in the total migrant share have a limited effect on far-right support at this more granular spatial level. One possible interpretation is that far-right voters may respond more strongly to migration when it affects local labour market conditions than when it manifests through day to day contact in their residential environments.

For the centre-right coalition, the municipal results are clearer. A one standard deviation increase in the migrant share is associated with gains of roughly three percentage

points for this coalition. The left-wing coalition also displays positive responses, although the changes are smaller in magnitude, generally in the range of one to two percentage points. Parties outside the traditional families tend to lose support as migration increases, in values very similar to those observed in local labour markets, which hints that job competition may not be especially relevant for their voters. The first stage statistics for this model are not particularly strong, which raises concerns about instrument weakness. As a robustness check, I estimated the corresponding limited information maximum likelihood model, reported in Appendix F. The LIML results are virtually identical to the 2SLS estimates, which mitigates the concern that the IV results are being driven by weak first stages. Overall, the municipal evidence indicates that immigration at the neighbourhood level does not expand far-right support. Instead, it appears to benefit both mainstream coalitions while reducing support for smaller, non-traditional electoral alternatives.

To examine whether cultural distance plays a role in shaping these responses, Table 6 separates migration from Spanish-speaking Iberian American countries and migration from Haiti. For the far-right, the estimates indicate that only Haitian inflows are clearly associated with declines in support. A one standard deviation increase in the Haitian migrant share is linked to a reduction of roughly three percentage points in the far-right vote, whereas the estimates for Hispanic migration seem not to be relevant. One interpretation is that neighbourhoods exposed to culturally distinct migrants may be less receptive to far-right narratives portraying these inflows as harmful. Haitian migrants face stronger linguistic and social barriers and therefore may be perceived as less threatening in terms of economic competition, while their presence may also weaken claims linking cultural change to disorder or crime. This pattern stands in contrast to findings from other settings, where culturally distant migration often strengthens support for exclusionary or right-wing parties (e.g. Brunner & Kuhn, 2018; Mendez & Cutillas, 2014). The Chilean case therefore suggests that cultural distance does not uniformly generate support for the far-right and that the specific social and economic position of incoming groups may shape reactions in different ways. In terms of the theoretical expectations outlined earlier, the municipal Haitian results are not consistent with Hypothesis 1b, which anticipated that culturally distant migration at the neighbourhood level would strengthen far-right support.

For the centre-right coalition, both Hispanic and Haitian inflows are associated with increases in vote shares, with somewhat larger gains linked to the Haitian inflow. This pattern suggests that centre-right parties may be able to accommodate concerns about immigration without endorsing the more radical positions of the far-right, attracting voters in neighbourhoods experiencing growing diversity regardless of the racial or cultural composition of the inflow. Appendix Table C.5 shows that both types of migration tend to increase support for the left and reduce votes for non-traditional parties, although the

magnitudes vary across specifications. Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of cultural proximity in understanding neighbourhood-level responses to migration and help explain why the far-right does not gain electoral support in areas experiencing Haitian inflows.

Table 7: 2SLS model: Low-skilled migration changes by origin and Right-Wing vote share changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	**IV**	**IV**	**IV**
Panel A: Far right				
Migrant share low skilled Hispanic	-0.0124**	-0.0144		-0.0179
	(0.00525)	(0.0124)		(0.0126)
Migrant share low skilled Haiti	-0.0147***		-0.0469**	-0.0341***
	(0.00428)		(0.0229)	(0.0114)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right				
Migrant share low skilled Hispanic	0.000673	0.0309***		0.0349***
	(0.00628)	(0.0111)		(0.0134)
Migrant share low skilled Haiti	0.0191***		0.0643*	0.0393***
	(0.00394)		(0.0333)	(0.0117)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variable: Low skilled migrant share, Hispanic countries and Haiti				
Instrument Hispanic		0.000107***		0.000107***
		(2.82e-05)		(2.90e-05)
Instrument Haiti			6.88e-05***	8.13e-05***
			(8.85e-06)	(9.43e-06)
F-Test		14.46	60.41	22.48
Partial R^2		0.139	0.0260	
Partial R^2 (Hispanic)				0.139
Partial R^2 (Haiti)				0.0342

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in low-skilled migration from Hispanic countries and Haiti on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the low-skilled migrant share from Hispanic countries and the low-skilled migrant share from Haiti, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants from the corresponding origin group divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Since Haitian migration is overwhelmingly low-skilled, Table 7 focuses on low-skilled inflows to provide a cleaner test of the cultural mechanism. By holding skill composition constant and comparing culturally similar and culturally distinct migrants within the same segment of the labour force, this specification reduces concerns that differences in labour market competitiveness drive the contrasting reactions observed earlier. The results show that increases in the low-skilled Haitian share are associated with declines in

far-right support and gains for the centre-right, while low-skilled Hispanic inflows mainly reinforce the centre-right with limited implications for the far-right. In this more restricted comparison, cultural distance does not generate a far-right response, suggesting that once the economic profile of migrants is taken into account, culturally distinct inflows do not translate into higher support for exclusionary parties.

Taken together, the municipal results indicate that migration does not trigger a far-right backlash at the neighbourhood scale, even when inflows come from culturally distant and economically vulnerable groups. Instead, the estimates are consistent with the idea that everyday contact with culturally distinct newcomers may reduce the appeal of more exclusionary platforms and redirect voters toward moderate alternatives. At the same time, the centre-right tends to benefit from both culturally similar and culturally different inflows, which suggests that these parties can absorb voter concerns about immigration without adopting the more radical positions characteristic of the far-right[11].

5.2.1 Turnout

To assess whether the electoral changes documented above reflect shifts in political preferences or changes in political participation, Tables 8 and 9 report the instrumental variables estimates for turnout at the local labour market and municipal levels. Because the hypotheses focus on vote choice rather than on participation per se, the turnout analysis serves as a diagnostic check to ensure that observed changes in vote shares are not simply driven by changes in the size of the voting electorate.

At the labour market scale, the results point to a modest positive association between migration and turnout. A one standard deviation increase in the migrant share is linked to an increase of about two percentage points in participation, with both high-skilled and low-skilled inflows displaying similar patterns. This suggests that immigration may have heightened the political salience of local conditions or activated voters who hold strong views about migration, independent of their partisan preferences. However, the magnitude of this turnout increase is small relative to the six percentage point gains observed for the centre-right in the labour market analysis, which indicates that participation changes alone cannot account for the electoral shifts documented above.

At the municipal level, the estimated effects are smaller. Increases in the total migrant share and in Hispanic migration correspond to slight increases in turnout, while Haitian migration seems not to affect participation. These patterns indicate that immigration does not substantially alter turnout at the neighbourhood scale. Taken together, the turnout results suggest that the electoral shifts observed in the labour market and municipal analyses are driven more by changes in vote allocation across coalitions than by broad changes in participation. Migration appears to reconfigure the distribution of

[11] See Appendix A for party Manifests related to migratory topics

Table 8: 2SLS model: Migration changes and turnout changes in local labour markets

Dependent Variable % turnout	Turnout		
	IV	IV	IV
Total migrant share	0.0197***		
	(0.00372)		
High-skilled migrant share		0.00997***	
		(0.00230)	
Low-skilled migrant share			0.0274***
			(0.00440)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285
First Stage Regressions			
Endogenous variables: Total, high-skilled, and low-skilled migration			
Instrument Total	3.16e-06***		
	(6.01e-07)		
Instrument high-skilled		2.43e-05***	
		(2.55e-06)	
Instrument low-skilled			3.68e-06***
			(9.42e-07)
F-Test	27.65	90.55	15.28
Partial R^2	0.0115	0.0407	0.00592

Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration on turnout between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable is the change in the turnout rate in each local labour market. The main independent variables are the total migrant share, the high-skilled migrant share, and the low-skilled migrant share, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants divided by the local population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the level of local labour markets. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each labour market in 2021. The upper panel presents the second stage estimates. The lower panel reports the first stage results for each endogenous variable, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

votes rather than the size of the electorate that turns out to vote.

5.3 Robustness checks

The instrumental variables strategy rests on several modelling choices that may shape the results. In this subsection I summarise a set of robustness exercises designed to assess the sensitivity of the main findings and to be transparent about the remaining limitations.

A first concern is that the labour market estimates may be driven disproportionately by Santiago, which is treated as a single local labour market. Santiago concentrates around 36.5% of the national population and 58.3% of all migrants, so it could dominate the identifying variation. Appendix D reports models estimated after excluding Santiago

Table 9: 2SLS model: Migration changes and turnout changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % turnout	Turnout		
	IV	IV	IV
Total migrant share	0.0166*		
	(0.00889)		
Hispanic migrant share		0.0172*	
		(0.00892)	
Haitian migrant share			0.0124
			(0.00919)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
First Stage Regressions			
Endogenous variables: Total, Hispanic, and Haitian migration			
Instrument Total	4.77e-05***		
	(1.62e-05)		
Instrument Hispanic		5.95e-05**	
		(2.31e-05)	
Instrument Haitian			7.22e-05***
			(1.02e-05)
F-Test	8.697	6.626	50.27
Partial R^2	0.140	0.148	0.0297

Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration on turnout between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable is the change in the turnout rate in each municipality. The main independent variables are the total migrant share, the Hispanic migrant share, and the Haitian migrant share, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants from the corresponding origin group divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panel presents the second stage estimates. The lower panel reports the first stage results for each endogenous variable, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

from the sample (Tables D.7 and D.8). The IV coefficients remain very similar in sign and magnitude: increases in migration are still associated with lower support for the far-right and higher support for the centre-right, and the patterns by skill composition are preserved. The results for the left-wing coalition and for parties outside the traditional families show more variation once Santiago is removed, which is consistent with the fact that non-traditional parties tend to be stronger outside the capital. These shifts, however, do not alter the main interpretation of the right-wing results. The first stage remains reasonably strong, and the substantive conclusions of the labour market models do not depend on the inclusion of Santiago.

A second concern is the relatively modest first stage strength in the municipal models,

which raises the possibility of weak instrument bias. To address this issue, I re-estimated the municipal specifications using limited information maximum likelihood. The corresponding estimates, reported in Appendix F (Table F.10), are virtually identical to the 2SLS results for all four coalitions. This similarity reduces the concern that the main IV results at the municipal level are being driven by weak instruments.

Finally, I assess whether the results are sensitive to the choice of base year used to construct the historical migrant shares. The main analysis relies on shares measured in 2008, well before the large inflows that followed 2015. Appendix E reports municipal models that instead use 2012 pre-shares as the basis for the shift–share instrument (Table E.9). The estimates are very similar to those obtained with the 2008 baseline: migration continues to be associated with higher support for the centre-right and the left, lower support for other parties, and no clear expansion of the far-right. Using 2012 shares strengthens the first stage, but it also moves the pre-period closer to the treatment window and therefore makes it harder to ensure that earlier electoral dynamics do not influence subsequent migrant settlement. Choosing 2008 as the main baseline therefore aligns the empirical strategy with the identification logic of the shift–share model, since historical settlement patterns are measured well before the recent migration surge, which reduces the risk that pre-treatment political trends contaminate the instrument. The stability of the results across the 2008 and 2012 baselines suggests that the substantive conclusions are not driven by the particular choice of pre-period, while the main specifications retain a more conservative distance between the historical shares and the post-2015 migration shocks.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

A large literature in political economy and political behaviour has examined how migration shapes electoral support for anti-immigrant and far-right parties, with most evidence drawn from Western Europe and the United States. This focus contrasts sharply with the global distribution of migration, as developing and middle-income countries host the vast majority of the world's migrants (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). In these newer destination contexts, migration is often recent, welfare states are more limited, labour markets are more informal, and party systems are still adapting to demographic change. Understanding how migration affects political behaviour in such settings is therefore essential, both for assessing the scope conditions of existing theories and for explaining contemporary patterns of far-right mobilisation beyond the Global North.

This paper provides evidence from Chile, a middle-income democracy that experienced rapid inflows from two large and distinctive diasporas. Venezuelan migrants share language and ethnicity with Chileans and span a broad skill distribution, while Haitian

migrants differ sharply in language, race, and salience. Because these inflows arrived recently and at speed, Chile offers leverage on competing mechanisms in a setting where attitudes and partisan alignments around migration are still forming. The Chilean case is also politically consequential. A major far-right force emerged during the same period, raising the question of whether migration exposure in local communities contributed to its electoral rise.

The core findings show that, in areas that experienced larger migrant inflows, immigration did not increase support for far-right presidential candidates. Instead, migration reduced far-right support and increased support for the centre-right. This pattern appears both in local labour markets, where concerns about job competition and public services should be most salient, and at the municipal level, where cultural visibility and everyday interaction are more pronounced. Culturally distant Haitian inflows did not generate a cultural-threat backlash. Once skill differences are held constant, they are associated with lower far-right support. These results align with a growing set of studies documenting null or negative effects of immigration on far-right voting (Lonsky, 2021; Pagliacci & Bonacini, 2022), and they suggest that the political consequences of local migration exposure can diverge sharply from expectations derived from long-standing immigration destinations.

A central implication is that local exposure to migration does not mechanically translate into far-right mobilisation, even in contexts where exclusionary rhetoric is salient. One plausible interpretation is that when migration is recent and attitudes are still forming, local exposure may weaken exclusionary appeals through everyday interaction or familiarity, consistent with work distinguishing exposure from contact and showing that direct interaction can temper support for exclusionary politics (Steinmayr, 2021). This logic may be especially relevant when migrants are perceived as vulnerable or as fleeing severe hardship, as humanitarian frames and perceptions of migrant vulnerability have been shown to elicit more favourable attitudes among natives (Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Bansak et al., 2016). A second interpretation emphasises how migration-related concern is politically expressed in newer destination contexts. Where public debate centres on regulation, legality, and state capacity rather than redistribution alone, voters who experience migration locally may respond by favouring parties perceived as capable of governance rather than by endorsing radical exclusion. Finally, where far-right actors have not fully consolidated ownership over immigration as a political issue, migration-related concerns may be channelled into shifts within the right-wing camp rather than into uniform gains for far-right candidates. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive, and the present design cannot adjudicate among them directly, but together they provide a coherent account of why migration exposure can weaken rather than strengthen far-right support in this context.

These findings point to several directions for future research, particularly in the Global South and other newer migration destinations. First, work combining local ex-

posure designs with survey data could clarify whether observed electoral shifts reflect changes in perceived economic threat, cultural threat, humanitarian concern, or evaluations of governing competence. Second, further research is needed on the role of security narratives and perceptions of disorder in shaping political reactions to migration, especially in contexts where crime is highly salient and often politicised. Third, understanding how media coverage and elite framing interact with local exposure to migration remains crucial for explaining when exclusionary narratives succeed and when they fail.

Beyond Chile, the results have broader implications for the generalizability of existing theories linking migration to far-right voting. Chile shares several structural features with other democracies that have recently become migration destinations, including rapid and geographically concentrated inflows, constrained welfare provision, persistent labour market informality, and volatile party systems. In such contexts, local exposure to migration may be more likely to reorganise competition within the right than to generate automatic far-right gains. At the same time, these dynamics are unlikely to be universal. The electoral consequences of migration should depend on the scale and visibility of inflows, local labour market conditions, cultural distance, and whether mainstream parties can credibly respond to migration-related concerns without embracing exclusionary rhetoric. Chile should therefore be viewed as informative for a broader class of newer destination democracies, particularly in Latin America, rather than as a universal template.

This study advances the migration–politics literature in three ways. First, by examining a Global South democracy where both large-scale immigration and far-right mobilisation are recent, it provides new evidence on the scope conditions under which migration does, or does not, strengthen exclusionary actors. Second, by analysing a setting in which economic and cultural dimensions of migration vary sharply across groups, it offers clearer leverage on competing mechanisms than contexts in which these dimensions are tightly bundled. Third, the findings underscore the importance of political mediation in shaping the electoral consequences of migration. Even when immigration becomes salient and far-right actors mobilise around exclusionary narratives, local exposure to migrants need not benefit the far-right if alternative political responses are available and credible.

Understanding how migration shapes political behaviour is essential for designing policies that improve integration, reduce social tensions, and prevent the consolidation of xenophobic or exclusionary movements. The Chilean case shows that the electoral effects of migration depend not only on who migrates and where, but also on how migration-related concerns are channelled through political competition in newer destination contexts. As migration within the Global South continues to rise, explaining when local exposure fuels exclusionary politics and when it instead shifts support toward more moderate responses will remain a central challenge for research and policy.

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Appendix

Appendix Index

A Party Families, Coalitions, and Immigration Rhetoric

This appendix provides additional detail on the ideological classification of the four major political coalitions used in this paper, based on The Manifesto Project. Table A.1 reports the average left–right positions and the immigration-related manifesto scores for each coalition in the 2009–2021 period. These classifications follow the Manifesto Project Handbook (Manifesto Project, 2011), which distinguishes Conservative, Social Democratic, Socialist, and Nationalist or Radical Right party families and provides a consistent framework for comparing coalitions over time.

The left and centre-left coalitions correspond to parties that the Manifesto Project places in the Socialist, Social Democratic, and Christian Democratic traditions. These coalitions historically emphasise redistribution, welfare expansion, labour rights, and culturally liberal positions. The centre-right coalition corresponds to Chile Vamos and its successor alliances, which belong to the Conservative family and combine market-oriented economic positions with cultural conservatism. The far-right coalition is represented by the Republican Party and the Partido Social Cristiano, classified in the Nationalist and Radical Right family, which places greater emphasis on cultural homogeneity, national identity, and restrictive immigration stances.

The immigration scores in Table A.1 summarise the direction and salience of immigration-related rhetoric in each coalition's manifesto. Positive values in the "Immigration Negative" column indicate more restrictive positions, while positive values in the "Immigration Positive" column reflect inclusionary positions. Consistent with their party family profiles, the far-right coalition expresses the strongest anti-immigration rhetoric in 2017 and 2021, the centre-right shows a modest restrictive shift in 2021, and both the left and centre-left coalitions consistently adopt neutral or inclusionary positions throughout the period.

Table A.1: Manifesto Project Party Characteristics

Coalition	Right - left Index	Immigration Negative Score				Immigration Positive Score			
	Average	2009	2013	2017	2021	2009	2013	2017	2021
Left	-35.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.27	0.07
Center-Left	-21.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.15
Center-Right	-11.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32
Far-right	0.40			0.88	1.19			0.00	0.00

Source: Manifesto Project Version 2024a. Parties by coalition are: (a) Frente Amplio, Apruebo Dignidad and Partido Progresista for the Left Coalition; (b) Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia y Nueva Mayoria (Socialist Party and Christian Democrat Party) for the center-left Coalition; (c) Chile Vamos and Chile Podemos más (Renovación Nacional y Unión Demócrata Independiente) for the center-right Coalition; and (d) Partido Social Cristiano y Partido Republicano for the far-Right Coalition.

B Two-way fixed effects models: Heterogeneous Migration

Table B.2: Two-way fixed effects model: Vote share and high-skilled and low-skilled migration

	Far-Right		Center-Right		Left-Wing		Other	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
High-skilled Migr. Ratio	-0.025	-0.021	0.060***	0.059***	0.032**	0.035***	-0.067***	-0.073***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Low-skilled Migr. Ratio	-0.055*	-0.042	-0.025	-0.029	-0.079***	-0.069***	0.159***	0.140***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Observations	570	570	570	570	570	570	570	570
Adjusted R^2	0.901	0.905	0.947	0.948	0.761	0.775	0.833	0.863
N° of IDs	285	285	285	285	285	285	285	285
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports estimates from two-way fixed effects regressions for the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections (Equation 1). The dependent variable is the vote share of each political bloc in each year. The key independent variables are the high-skilled migration ratio and the low-skilled migration ratio, defined as the shares of immigrants in each skill group relative to the local population, then standardized. All models include year fixed effects and city fixed effects. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each locality. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B.3: Two-way fixed effects model: Vote share and cultural similar and different migration

	Far-Right		Center-Right		Left-Wing		Other	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hispanic Migr. Ratio	-0.063***	-0.038*	0.018	-0.002	-0.048***	-0.046***	0.093***	0.086***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Haiti Migr. Ratio	-0.019***	-0.016***	0.024***	0.018***	0.013***	0.009**	-0.018***	-0.011**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	690	690	690	690	690	690	690	690
Adjusted R^2	0.890	0.898	0.937	0.941	0.759	0.775	0.807	0.836
N° of IDs	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reports estimates from two-way fixed effects regressions for the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections (Equation 2). The dependent variable is the vote share of each political bloc in each year. The key independent variables are the migration ratios from culturally similar countries and culturally different Haiti, defined as the shares of immigrants from each country group relative to the local population, then standardized. All models include year fixed effects and city fixed effects. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each locality. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

C Two Stage Least Square Models: Full Regressions and Heterogeneous Migration

Table C.4: 2SLS model: Skilled migration changes and vote share changes in local labour markets

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	**IV**	**IV**	**IV**
Panel A: Far right				
High-skilled migrant share	-0.00952	-0.0198***		-0.0147**
	(0.00696)	(0.00278)		(0.00662)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0132		-0.0551***	-0.0156
	(0.00885)		(0.00752)	(0.0183)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel B: Center right				
High-skilled migrant share	0.0242***	0.0316***		0.0394***
	(0.00682)	(0.00220)		(0.00554)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0106		0.0820***	-0.0237
	(0.00867)		(0.0129)	(0.0153)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel C: Left wing				
High-skilled migrant share	0.0153***	0.0125***		0.0374***
	(0.00434)	(0.00367)		(0.00968)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0244***		0.0246	-0.0757***
	(0.00529)		(0.0211)	(0.0263)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel D: Other				
High-skilled migrant share	-0.0300***	-0.0243***		-0.0621***
	(0.00487)	(0.00425)		(0.0112)
Low-skilled migrant share	0.0482***		-0.0515*	0.115***
	(0.00646)		(0.0302)	(0.0310)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variables: High-skilled and Low-skilled migrant share				
Instrument for high-skilled		2.43e-05***		-0.000135
		(2.55e-06)		(0.000111)
Instrument for low-skilled			3.68e-06***	0.000152***
			(9.42e-07)	(2.89e-05)
F-Test		90.55	15.28	8.940
Partial R^2		0.0407	0.00592	
Partial R^2 (High-skilled)				0.0467
Partial R^2 (Low-skilled)				0.0383

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in high-skilled and low-skilled migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the high-skilled migrant share and the low-skilled migrant share, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants in the corresponding skill group divided by the 2021 local population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the level of local labour markets. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each labour market in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table C.5: 2SLS model: Migration changes by origin and vote share changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	**IV**	**IV**	**IV**
Panel A: Far right				
Migrant share Hispanic	-0.0124***	-0.00703		-0.0109
	(0.00470)	(0.0129)		(0.0116)
Migrant share Haiti	-0.0144***		-0.0447**	-0.0333***
	(0.00438)		(0.0220)	(0.0123)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right				
Migrant share Hispanic	0.00424	0.0251**		0.0289**
	(0.00558)	(0.0107)		(0.0119)
Migrant share Haiti	0.0186***		0.0630*	0.0329***
	(0.00406)		(0.0332)	(0.00901)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel C: Left wing				
Migrant share Hispanic	-0.00924*	0.0129**		0.0154**
	(0.00481)	(0.00622)		(0.00732)
Migrant share Haiti	0.0111***		0.0374*	0.0214***
	(0.00278)		(0.0206)	(0.00775)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel D: Other				
Migrant share Hispanic	0.0174**	-0.0309**		-0.0334**
	(0.00842)	(0.0121)		(0.0135)
Migrant share Haiti	-0.0153***		-0.0557*	-0.0209**
	(0.00382)		(0.0328)	(0.0104)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variable: Migrant share of Hispanic countries and Haiti				
Instrument Hispanic		5.95e-05**		5.65e-05**
		(2.31e-05)		(2.32e-05)
Instrument Haiti			7.22e-05***	9.03e-05***
			(1.02e-05)	(1.15e-05)
F-Test		6.626	50.27	18.85
Partial R^2		0.148	0.0297	
Partial R^2 (Hispanic)				0.150
Partial R^2 (Haiti)				0.0423

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration from Hispanic countries and Haiti on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the migrant share from Hispanic countries and the migrant share from Haiti, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants from the corresponding origin group divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table C.6: 2SLS model: Low-skilled migration changes by origin and vote share changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Panel A: Far right				
Migrant share low skilled Hispanic	-0.0124**	-0.0144		-0.0179
	(0.00525)	(0.0124)		(0.0126)
Migrant share low skilled Haiti	-0.0147***		-0.0469**	-0.0341***
	(0.00428)		(0.0229)	(0.0114)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right				
Migrant share low skilled Hispanic	0.000673	0.0309***		0.0349***
	(0.00628)	(0.0111)		(0.0134)
Migrant share low skilled Haiti	0.0191***		0.0643*	0.0393***
	(0.00394)		(0.0333)	(0.0117)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel C: Left wing				
Migrant share low skilled Hispanic	-0.0125***	0.0100		0.0128
	(0.00471)	(0.00780)		(0.00818)
Migrant share low skilled Haiti	0.0111***		0.0369*	0.0277**
	(0.00272)		(0.0195)	(0.0108)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel D: Other				
Migrant share low skilled Hispanic	0.0243***	-0.0265**		-0.0298**
	(0.00792)	(0.0125)		(0.0137)
Migrant share low skilled Haiti	-0.0156***		-0.0543*	-0.0329***
	(0.00369)		(0.0306)	(0.0126)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variable: Low skilled migrant share, Hispanic countries and Haiti				
Instrument Hispanic		0.000107***		0.000107***
		(2.82e-05)		(2.90e-05)
Instrument Haiti			6.88e-05***	8.13e-05***
			(8.85e-06)	(9.43e-06)
F-Test		14.46	60.41	22.48
Partial R^2		0.139	0.0260	
Partial R^2 (Hispanic)				0.139
Partial R^2 (Haiti)				0.0342

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in low-skilled migration from Hispanic countries and Haiti on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the low-skilled migrant share from Hispanic countries and the low-skilled migrant share from Haiti, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants from the corresponding origin group divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

D IV Results Robustness Analyses without Santiago

Table D.7: 2SLS model: Migration changes and vote share changes in local labour markets excluding Santiago

Dependent Variable % vote	Models		
	OLS	**IV**	**IV - Control**
Panel A: Far right			
Migration ratio change	-0.0233***	-0.0572***	-0.0480***
	(0.00639)	(0.0168)	(0.0179)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	284	284	284
Panel B: Center right			
Migration ratio change	0.00475	0.0456**	0.0446**
	(0.00717)	(0.0196)	(0.0196)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	284	284	284
Panel C: Left wing			
Migration ratio change	-0.0195***	-0.0450***	-0.0429***
	(0.00403)	(0.00998)	(0.0116)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	284	284	284
Panel D: Other			
Migration ratio change	0.0381***	0.0566***	0.0463***
	(0.00591)	(0.0155)	(0.0164)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	284	284	284
Panel E: First stage regression			
Endogenous variable: Migration ratio change			
Instrument		7.25e-05***	6.48e-05***
		(2.25e-05)	(1.71e-05)
F-Test		10.40	14.40
Partial R^2		0.0501	0.0442

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variable is the migration ratio change, defined as the change in the number of immigrants divided by the local population and standardized. The shift–share instrument is constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the level of local labour markets, excluding the city of Santiago. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each labour market in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table D.8: 2SLS model: High-skilled and low-skilled migration changes and vote share changes in local labour markets excluding Santiago

Dependent Variable % vote	Models			
	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Panel A: Far right				
High-skilled migrant share	-0.00935	-0.0353***		-0.0321***
	(0.00713)	(0.00939)		(0.0118)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0133		-0.0524**	-0.00843
	(0.00889)		(0.0216)	(0.0189)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	284	284	284	284
Panel B: Center right				
High-skilled migrant share	0.0238***	0.0429***		0.0544***
	(0.00697)	(0.00911)		(0.00999)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0105		0.0447**	-0.0299*
	(0.00872)		(0.0220)	(0.0153)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	284	284	284	284
Panel C: Left wing				
High-skilled migrant share	0.0149***	-0.0177**		0.00635
	(0.00446)	(0.00770)		(0.0108)
Low-skilled migrant share	-0.0243***		-0.0542***	-0.0629***
	(0.00531)		(0.0142)	(0.0201)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	284	284	284	284
Panel D: Other				
High-skilled migrant share	-0.0294***	0.0100		-0.0286**
	(0.00498)	(0.0116)		(0.0141)
Low-skilled migrant share	0.0480***		0.0619***	0.101***
	(0.00646)		(0.0191)	(0.0265)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	284	284	284	284
Panel E: First stage regressions				
Endogenous variables: High-skilled and Low-skilled migrant share				
Instrument for high-skilled		0.000340***		0.000155
		(9.84e-05)		(0.000114)
Instrument for low-skilled			8.86e-05***	0.000158***
			(2.05e-05)	(2.95e-05)
F-Test		11.96	18.71	9.322
Partial R^2		0.0628	0.0351	
Partial R^2 (High-skilled)				0.0719
Partial R^2 (Low-skilled)				0.0456

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in high-skilled and low-skilled migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variables are the high-skilled migrant share and the low-skilled migrant share, each defined as the change in the number of immigrants in the corresponding skill group divided by the local population and standardized. The shift–share instruments are constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the level of local labour markets, excluding the city of Santiago. All columns include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each labour market in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results for both endogenous variables, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

E IV Results with an alternative base year (2012)

Table E.9: 2SLS model: Migration changes and vote share changes in municipalities using 2012 pre-shares

Dependent Variable % vote	Models		
	OLS	**IV**	**IV - Control**
Panel A: Far right			
Migration ratio change	-0.0211***	-0.0166	-0.0135
	(0.00510)	(0.0128)	(0.0105)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right			
Migration ratio change	0.0120**	0.0307***	0.0277***
	(0.00525)	(0.0113)	(0.0100)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel C: Left wing			
Migration ratio change	-0.00730	0.0142**	0.0143***
	(0.00468)	(0.00684)	(0.00516)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel D: Other			
Migration ratio change	0.0164**	-0.0282**	-0.0285***
	(0.00818)	(0.0134)	(0.00956)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regression			
Endogenous variable: Migration ratio change			
Instrument		5.32e-05***	5.40e-05***
		(1.57e-05)	(1.50e-05)
F-Test		11.53	12.98
Partial R^2		0.171	0.185

Notes: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effect of changes in migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variable is the migration ratio change, defined as the change in the number of immigrants divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instrument is constructed using 2012 migrant shares and follows Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the second stage estimates. Panel E reports the first stage results, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

F IV Results with LIML

Table F.10: LIML model: Migration changes and vote share changes at the municipal level

Dependent Variable % vote	Models		
	OLS	**IV**	**IV - Control**
Panel A: Far right			
Migration ratio change	-0.0211***	-0.0147	-0.0124
	(0.00510)	(0.0158)	(0.0129)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel B: Center right			
Migration ratio change	0.0120**	0.0344**	0.0307**
	(0.00525)	(0.0143)	(0.0125)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel C: Left wing			
Migration ratio change	-0.00730	0.0180**	0.0166***
	(0.00468)	(0.00907)	(0.00638)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel D: Other			
Migration ratio change	0.0164**	-0.0376**	-0.0349***
	(0.00818)	(0.0182)	(0.0123)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	345	345	345
Panel E: First stage regression			
Endogenous variable: Migration ratio change			
Instrument		4.60e-05***	4.77e-05***
		(1.71e-05)	(1.62e-05)
F-Test		7.238	8.697
Partial R^2		0.124	0.140

Notes: The table reports OLS and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates for the effect of changes in migration on electoral outcomes between 2017 and 2021. The dependent variable in each panel is the change in the vote share of the corresponding political coalition. The main independent variable is the migration ratio change, defined as the change in the number of immigrants divided by the municipal population and standardized. The shift–share instrument is constructed following Equation 4. All results are estimated at the municipal level. Columns with controls include the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2021. The upper panels present the LIML second stage estimates. Panel E reports the corresponding first stage results, including the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistic and the partial R^2. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

G Goldsmith–Pinkham Validity Checks

This appendix presents the robustness exercises used to assess the internal validity of the shift–share instrumental variables strategy. Following Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020), I report the Rotemberg weights associated with each origin-specific component of the instrument and estimate a set of pre-trend regressions for cities and municipalities. These tests evaluate whether the baseline migrant shares predict electoral changes in the pre-treatment period.

Table G.11: Rotemberg weights for the migrant shares

Country	Cities		Municipalities	
	No controls	With controls	No controls	With controls
Venezuela	0.42396002	0.43575713	0.32907793	0.36058816
Haiti	0.18111949	0.18467205	0.19407199	0.17779111
Peru	0.10095579	0.09891052	0.17991684	0.17382301
Bolivia	0.10839509	0.09525903	0.09109958	0.07839336
Colombia	0.09838177	0.09757843	0.11235263	0.11361538
Ecuador	0.01974995	0.01974060	0.02347674	0.02299945
Argentina	0.01090224	0.01112717	0.00759283	0.00796305
Cuba	0.01073014	0.01095566	0.01349934	0.01395571
Dominican Republic	0.00968813	0.00946065	0.01348429	0.01335410
Brazil	0.00771583	0.00789297	0.00660935	0.00707289
China	0.00730771	0.00709302	0.01233011	0.01201252
Spain	0.00366983	0.00380348	0.00253341	0.00298700
United States	0.00345887	0.00358391	0.00251590	0.00292452
Paraguay	0.00250695	0.00244576	0.00216741	0.00213559
Mexico	0.00240131	0.00244779	0.00190060	0.00211542
Uruguay	0.00176846	0.00180176	0.00153295	0.00164497
France	0.00125779	0.00129907	0.00086010	0.00104458
Italy	0.00119127	0.00123445	0.00083541	0.00096941
India	0.00074839	0.00071221	0.00085532	0.00086884
Germany	0.00054814	0.00057581	0.00030282	0.00039322
El Salvador	0.00045850	0.00047009	0.00045914	0.00050169
South Korea	0.00044612	0.00045396	0.00042003	0.00046342
Russia	0.00035188	0.00036931	0.00029669	0.00034125
United Kingdom	0.00031796	0.00033115	0.00021753	0.00025984
Canada	0.00031342	0.00032044	0.00022541	0.00025134
Japan	0.00030066	0.00030418	0.00021131	0.00024929
Costa Rica	0.00029912	0.00030799	0.00019462	0.00023239
Panama	0.00025087	0.00026012	0.00031503	0.00033301
Australia	0.00022662	0.00023032	0.00022594	0.00024084
Netherlands	0.00014757	0.00015336	0.00010244	0.00011828
Taiwan	0.00011927	0.00011649	0.00012845	0.00012837
Switzerland	0.00010485	0.00011304	0.00005821	0.00007350
Belgium	0.00010456	0.00010800	0.00006249	0.00007501
Sweden	0.00006425	0.00007182	0.00004661	0.00005399
Israel	0.00003717	0.00003828	0.00002056	0.00002550

Notes: This table reports the Rotemberg weights associated with the shift–share instruments used in the analysis. The weights measure the proportional contribution of each origin country to the identifying variation in the migrant share instrument. Columns separate specifications estimated at the local labour market and municipality levels, with and without covariates. The covariates are the proportion of women and the elderly dependence rate in each municipality in 2008.

Table G.12: Pre-trend regressions for Local Labour Markets (cities)

Variables	Dependent variable: change in % vote			
	Right-Wing (2005)	Right-Wing (1989-2005)	Left-Wing (2005)	Left-Wing (1989-2005)
Panel A: Main Instrument with 2008 migrant shares				
Instrument	0.000586	0.000912	-0.000586	-0.000912
	(0.000447)	(0.000570)	(0.000447)	(0.000570)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	283	282	283	282
R-squared	0.058	0.098	0.058	0.098
Panel B: Venezuela Share				
Venezuela migrant share 2008	0.000573	0.00111	-0.000573	-0.00111
	(0.000444)	(0.000677)	(0.000444)	(0.000677)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	283	282	283	282
R-squared	0.058	0.099	0.058	0.099
Panel C: Haiti Share				
Haiti migrant share 2008	0.000377	0.000853	-0.000377	-0.000853
	(0.000299)	(0.000523)	(0.000299)	(0.000523)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	283	282	283	282
R-squared	0.058	0.098	0.058	0.098
Panel D: Peru Share				
Peru migrant share 2008	0.000493	0.000587	-0.000493	-0.000587
	(0.000369)	(0.000537)	(0.000369)	(0.000537)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	283	282	283	282
R-squared	0.058	0.098	0.058	0.098
Panel E: Top five origin countries				
Top five migrant share 2008	0.000590	0.000594	-0.000590	-0.000594
	(0.000459)	(0.000567)	(0.000459)	(0.000567)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	283	282	283	282
R-squared	0.058	0.098	0.058	0.098

Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the instrument and the migrant shares of the origin countries that receive the largest Rotemberg weights on the pre-period electoral changes. The dependent variables are changes in right-wing and left-wing vote shares in the 2005 election, and changes between 1989 and 2005. All specifications include demographic controls. Standard errors are robust.

Table G.13: Pre-trend regressions for municipalities

Variables	Dependent variable: change in % vote			
	Right-Wing (2005)	Right-Wing (1989-2005)	Left-Wing (2005)	Left-Wing (1989-2005)
Panel A: Main Instrument with 2008 migrant shares				
Instrument	-0.000599	0.000136	0.000599	-0.000136
	(0.00117)	(0.00236)	(0.00117)	(0.00236)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	341	334	341	334
R-squared	0.070	0.120	0.070	0.120
Panel B: Venezuela Share				
Venezuela migrant share 2008	-0.000596	0.00151	0.000596	-0.00151
	(0.00128)	(0.00254)	(0.00128)	(0.00254)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	341	334	341	334
R-squared	0.070	0.120	0.070	0.120
Panel C: Haiti Share				
Haiti migrant share 2008	-0.000794	-0.000947	0.000794	0.000947
	(0.000530)	(0.00113)	(0.000530)	(0.00113)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	341	334	341	334
R-squared	0.070	0.120	0.070	0.120
Panel D: Peru Share				
Peru migrant share 2008	-0.000248	-0.000573	0.000248	0.000573
	(0.000920)	(0.00158)	(0.000920)	(0.00158)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	341	334	341	334
R-squared	0.070	0.120	0.070	0.120
Panel E: Top five origin countries				
Top five migrant share 2008	-0.000508	-0.00111	0.000508	0.00111
	(0.00108)	(0.00188)	(0.00108)	(0.00188)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	341	334	341	334
R-squared	0.070	0.120	0.070	0.120

Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the instrument and the migrant shares of the origin countries that receive the largest Rotemberg weights on the pre-period electoral changes. The dependent variables are changes in right-wing and left-wing vote shares in the 2005 election, and changes between 1989 and 2005. All specifications include demographic controls. Standard errors are robust.